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Since the start of the economic crisis of the late 2000s, concerns have emerged in most 
developed countries about the distributional effect of the crisis and recovery, as in most OECD 
countries, the gap between rich and poor has widened. Recent evidence shows that income 
inequality has a negative impact on economic growth, mainly through lower levels of social 
mobility due to less investment in human capital. Other works distinguish between equality of 
opportunities and equality of outcomes as two parallel and differentiated components of 
inequality (World Bank, 2006), or between structural and market inequality (Easterly, 2007) 
having the latter an expected positive effect on economic growth. 
Some of the mechanisms underlying the relationship between inequality and economic growth 
might be particularly relevant at the regional level, as increasing evidence shows that local 
conditions can affect individual opportunities. For instance, analyses for the United States show 
that a neighbourhood’s average income has a large impact on individuals’ future earnings 
capacity, an effect that is roughly half of that related to parental income (Rothwell and Massey, 
2015). Glaeser et al. (2009) show that more unequal cities grow more slowly once controlling 
for the skill distribution. In the same vein, Chetty et al. (2014) find that individual opportunities 
differ substantially across cities in the United States and are negatively related with inequality  
One issue that deserves particular consideration and that has been less analysed in the literature 
is the length of the time horizon. Most of the literature has focused on the long-run relationship, 
while much less work exists in trying to understand the short term dynamics, even though 
several authors recognise different channels for different time dimensions (Forbes, 2000, 
Perugini and Martino, 2008). The Great Recession provides an important ground for research 
on the role of inequality and its interaction with the regional urban structure in the last decade. 
Regions with different levels of inequality might respond differently to the economic cycle. At 
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the same time, the effects of economic shocks can be heterogeneous by type of urban structure: 
in Europe highly urbanised regions were found to be particularly sensitive to the Great 
Recession (Dijkstra et al., 2015).   
This work provides new empirical evidence on the relationship between income inequalities 
and economic growth between 2003 and 2013 in a large sample of regions, including 15 OECD 
countries. Of the few works that have tried to explain such a relationship at the regional scale, 
most refer to regions within a single country, especially the United States (Frank, 2009; Fallah 
and Partridge, 2007; Partridge, 2006, among others), although some analyses have covered 
European regions (Ezcurra, 2007, 2010; Perugini and Martino, 2008; Rodríguez-Pose and 
Tselios, 2010). To the best of our knowledge, no works focus on the short-run relationship 
between inequality and growth at the regional level or cover the periods before and after the 
Great Recession. Including this period makes it possible to consider the role of inequality for 
regional resilience to economic shocks.  
This paper also focuses on the role of urban structure as a factor potentially affecting the 
inequality-economic growth relationship. Using a consistent definition of city helps identify the 
extent of urban concentration within regions while at the same time limiting the bias introduced 
by different administrative definitions across countries. The relationship between city size and 
economic growth has been recently analysed by Frick and Rodríguez-Pose (2016) for a wide 
sample of countries and Fothergill and Houston (2016) for the specific case of the United 
Kingdom. Their main result is that the prevailing view of a positive relationship between 
economic growth and city size does not hold. 
We estimate panel models with country fixed effects and we consider two sets of instruments 
for inequality, trying to mitigate endogeneity concerns. The main findings show that inequality 
and economic growth are negatively associated, particularly since the start of the economic 
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crisis, suggesting that more inclusive societies might foster regional resilience to economic 
shocks. Moreover, the link between inequality and growth is affected by urban size, with a 
stronger negative relationship in regions where most people live in medium to large cities.  
Next, section 2 provides the rationale for analysing the relationship between inequality and 
growth at the sub-national level. It also reviews the mechanisms through which inequality can 
affect economic growth. Section 3 presents the data and the empirical model, while section 4 
presents the main results. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Theoretical arguments and empirical findings: A view from the literature 
The bulk of the literature on the inequality-economic growth relationship tackles the national 
scale as the unit of analysis and focuses on mechanisms that play their role mostly in the long 
run. Ehrhart (2009) and Galor (2009) provide comprehensive overviews of theories and 
empirical evidence, a recent critical survey of the empirical works is provided by Neves and 
Silva (2014), while de Dominicis et al. (2008) and Neves et al. (2016) offer meta-analysis on 
the relationship between inequality and economic growth. Still, only a few studies have tried to 
explain the inequality-growth nexus at the sub-national level, although it is relevant for several 
reasons.  
First, smaller spatial entities better reflect the actual conditions experienced by people where 
they live, and this might reduce a potential omitted variable bias generated by national averages 
and incomparability across countries. Second, the use of regional data also helps to magnify 
how small disparities in initial conditions affect economic growth (Partridge, 2005), and it 
allows researchers to better account for patterns of urban agglomeration. Such patterns are 
certainly linked to inequalities through mechanisms of sorting the most talented individuals, 
selecting the most productive firms, and agglomerating the advantages of cities.  
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Third, many factors affecting people’s well-being and the business environment (e.g., crime, 
access to services, etc.) are also likely to be important at the local level. In particular, the socio-
economic characteristics of the communities where people actually live can affect individual 
opportunities (and choices), yielding different economic outcomes. Investment in human 
capital can be shaped by local conditions, including life expectancy (Rodríguez-Pose and 
Tselios, 2010), which can largely differ across regions: the difference between the best and the 
worst performing OECD region in terms of life expectancy is 15 years, more than double than 
among countries (OECD, 2014). 
Finally, compared with countries, regions are also much more open economies. Capital and 
labour – particularly a highly educated workforce – can move across regions at a lower cost and 
tend to move to places where they can enjoy higher returns. Cities certainly have an advantage 
in attracting capital and labour, thanks to more efficient provision of public services (due to 
economies of scale) and agglomeration economies. In principle, perfectly mobile production 
factors should yield, in equilibrium, an optimal allocation of resources with no spatial 
inequalities. However, even in the presence of perfect factor mobility, differences in initial 
factor endowments, sectoral specialisation, and agglomeration externalities can widen inter-
regional disparities (Rice and Venables, 2003). An initial higher level of specialisation in 
sectors requiring more highly skilled workers can attract further highly skilled labour and 
increase the gap in earnings. A possible consequence is that factor mobility increases income 
inequalities in relatively rich regions while reducing those in worse-off regions (Perugini and 
Martino, 2008). This might determine the co-existence of a positive relationship between 
inequality and growth at the regional level, with a negative relationship at the country level 
(Fallah and Partridge, 2007). Glaeser et al. (2009) report a positive association at the city level 
in the U.S. which becomes negative once skills distribution are controlled for.  
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Regarding the mechanisms underlying inequality-growth relationships, recent evidence at the 
national level shows that while in the short run a positive relationship predominates, in the long 
run the reverse is observed (Halter et al., 2014).1  
Long-run factors: 
The classical approach to the role of physical and human capital accumulation suggests that 
savings rates increase with wealth and that wealthier people have a higher marginal propensity 
to save, and as a result, in more unequal societies, aggregate investment in physical capital will 
be relatively higher, fostering economic growth (Barro, 2000).  
The modern paradigm focuses on the role of human capital accumulation rather than on 
investment in physical capital, the former being the major driver of growth in developed 
economies (Galor and Moav, 2004). According to Tselios (2008), the optimal level of schooling 
depends on the distribution of income, as the supply and demand curves have a different shape 
for different income groups. Another argument is that more equal societies give people greater 
opportunities to invest in human capital because of imperfections in the financial and credit 
markets that prevent worse-off individuals from carrying out such costly investments. In this 
view, more equal societies can be seen as opportunity enhancing, given the decreasing returns 
on investment in education at the individual level and the fact that households’ wealth is a major 
determinant of such investments. Recent empirical analyses further support the idea that 
obstacles to human capital accumulation drive the negative relationship between inequality and 
growth (Cingano, 2014).  
Economic incentives also play an important role in the long run. Societies in which ability is 
rewarded stimulate individual effort, productivity, and risk taking (Voitchovsky, 2005). These 
                                                          
1 Table A1.1 in Appendix 1 summarises the main theoretical arguments that have been put forward to uncover 
such a complex relationship and distinguishes mechanisms operating in the long-run from those having a role in 
a short-time horizon as well as growth-enhancing factors from growth-hindering factors. 
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economic incentives also affect the accumulation of human capital and the effort to seize the 
returns of skills, although in the low part of the wage distribution, they can be counterbalanced 
by feelings of unfairness (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990).  
Political economy factors also matter. Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Alesina and Rodrik 
(1994) argue that in relatively more unequal societies, people vote for higher taxation and 
redistribution. Higher taxation has a negative effect on incentives to invest, which, in turn, 
negatively affects economic growth.  
Short-run factors: 
One channel through which inequalities can affect economic growth in the short-run is political 
instability. Alesina and Perotti (1996) provide cross-country evidence that inequalities generate 
higher levels social discontent and political instability, which in turn yields lower levels of 
investment and economic growth At the regional level, this channel would play a role through 
higher levels of urban segregation or crime rates rather than institutional instability. In research 
on US metropolitan areas, Li et al. (2013) find that residential segregation by skills and race – 
which is likely to be reflected also in income levels – is negatively correlated with economic 
growth. 
A strand of literature argues that increasing inequality can affect both demand for and supply 
of credit (Morelli and Atkinson, 2015). Low-income households tend to increase their levels of 
indebtedness in order to maintain the stability of their consumption patterns. From a supply 
side, increasing loans to more risky individuals due to financial liberalization are likely to 
generate further instability in the financial system (Rajan, 2010; Bazilliers and Hericourt, 2012). 
Thus, inequality is likely to cause unhealthy credit booms, which can suddenly degenerate into 
financial instability (Perugini et al., 2016). 
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Short-term effects of inequality on economic growth can be determined by the existence of 
convex saving functions and high-risk propensity of wealthier individuals (Kuznets, 1955; 
Kaldor, 1955). A higher concentration of resources ensures that there will be at least a limited 
number of sufficiently rich investors to take on risky but high-return investment projects, which 
can in turn ensure higher growth rates. As these mechanisms are of a purely economic nature, 
they are likely to materialise relatively quickly (Halter et al., 2014). 
Last, on the demand side, the link between inequalities and growth depends on the balance 
between two different effects: market size and the dynamic price effect: in a short time horizon, 
innovation is affected by the demand for new products. The latter requires innovation, which 
in turn drives economic growth. In a more equal society, more individuals will be able to buy a 
new product, stimulating innovation by firms. However, the richest individuals have a greater 
willingness to pay for new goods and higher prices can be applied by monopolistic producers, 
stimulating further innovation (Bertola et al., 2006; Foellmi and Zwerimuller, 2006).   
Summarising, the existing empirical evidence on the inequality-growth nexus over the short-
run tends to confirm a positive association driven by different factors, as found for European 
regions in Perugini and Martino (2008) and Rodríquez-Pose and Tselios (2010). Grijalva (2012) 
found an inverse U-shaped relationship over both 5-year and 10-year periods using a large panel 
of countries. Going from the short to the medium-run time horizon, the relationship shifts 
downwards, meaning that the relationship turns negative at a lower level of inequality: Ezcurra 
(2007) finds a negative association for a sample of European regions over a ten years period. 
In the long-run (20-year time span) the relationship becomes linear and negative. Li and Zou 
(1998) and Forbes (2000) find a positive relationship over 5-year periods, while Barro (2000) 
finds that the relationship between inequality and growth over 10-year periods is negative for 
poor countries and positive for rich countries.  
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3. Data and facts 
Income inequality within regions 
The data set includes 209 TL2 regions2 from 15 OECD countries, of which 10 are European 
(Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Luxemburg, Spain, and the 
United Kingdom, accounting for 45% of all regions in the sample), four American (Canada, 
Chile, Mexico, and the United States, accounting for 52% of all regions) and one Asian (South 
Korea, 3% of all regions). Indicators of inequality at the regional level are computed using 
micro-data from household income surveys publicly available or made available through the 
OECD Income Distribution Database, following the method applied by Piacentini (2014). Table 
A1.2 in Appendix 1 provides details on the data sources. For reasons of robustness, inequalities 
within regions are computed using several indicators related to equivalized household annual 
disposable income: the Gini Index, the top-bottom quintile ratio (p80-20), the top-bottom decile 
ratio (p90-10), the bottom decile ratio (p50-10), the top decile ratio (p90-50), and the relative 
poverty rate using two alternative national poverty lines, at 40% and at 60% of the median 
income. The analysis uses the 2003-2013 income reference period. As this is a yearly panel, 
interpolated inequality statistics were used, usually for one year, when data on inequality is not 
available on a yearly basis (i.e., Chile, Korea, and Mexico). We work with an unbalanced panel 
with some attrition. For 2003 the data has 10 countries; 2010 is the only year with data for all 
15 countries; 13 countries for 2012; and 4 countries for 2013. The only country with information 
for the full period is the US, while for the United Kingdom data is available only from 2010 
onwards.  
                                                          
2 TL2 regions are the higher level of OECD regions, which correspond in most cases to the principal sub-national 
unit of government (states or provinces). There are 214 regions in the selected countries. Due to a lack of data on 
individual income, inequality statistics of five of these regions are not considered: three for Canada (Yukon, 
Northwest Territories, and Nunavut), one for Finland (Åland), and one for Korea (Jeju). 
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The dependent variable is the annual growth rate of per capita GDP in PPP-adjusted US dollars. 
A set of control variables was included to account for socio-economic and institutional factors 
that can have a role in regional economic growth. The basic statistics of the income distribution 
indicators are summarised in table A1.4 in Appendix 1, where one can see that given the short 
period under consideration, most of the variation in inequality is due to cross-sectional 
differences, as the variation in time is much smaller.  
Inequality, economic growth and urban concentration 
The strong decline in economic growth rates subsequent to the Great recession has been 
heterogeneous across regions and countries (OECD, 2013). A positive association is observed 
across OECD regions between GDP growth and several measures of income inequality (Table 
1). However, the sign of the correlations becomes negative when controlling for regions and 
time-fixed effects.  
[TABLE 1] 
 
It is documented that income inequality and urban size are positively associated (Baum-Snow 
and Pavan, 2013). Urbanisation and income inequality can be interpreted as the spatial 
concentration of human and physical capital in the process of development (Castells-Quintana 
and Royuela, 2014). By determining the allocation of resources across space and individuals, 
the interaction between urbanisation and inequality is therefore expected to have implications 
in terms of economic growth (Kim and Kim, 2003). The first step to exploring this issue is to 
assess the levels of inequality in regions by distinguishing the type and size of urban 
settlements. Urban population is identified using the functional urban areas (FUAs) defined by 
OECD (2012). The use of FUAs is a relevant contribution of this study, as it helps assess the 
extent of urban concentration within a region without relying on countries’ existing 
administrative definitions of cities, which can introduce biases in the analysis.  
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Regions were classified in three groups according to their urban structure: 99 regions that are 
either rural (11 regions) or where the largest urbanisation share is observed in smaller cities (88 
regions with cities with less than 500,000 inhabitants), 63 in medium-sized cities (between 
500,000 and 1.5 million inhabitants) and 52 in large cities (more than 1.5 million inhabitants). 
Most (56%) European regions have small cities, 3 out of 7 Korean regions (43%) have large 
cities, while the American regions of the sample are distributed among the three categories 
(38% small, 32% median, and 30% large cities).3 
In the sample of regions, inequalities are smaller the smaller the size of cities, though with 
considerable heterogeneity (Figure 1). This general evidence is robust to the use of several 
indicators of inequality, and differences are particularly strong for poverty rates and for the 
bottom decile ratio (Table 2). Several interpretations arise: more talented individuals tend to 
congregate in large cities where the returns to talent are higher and where there are more 
productive firms paying higher wages (Behrens et al., 2014); agglomeration economies can be 
a source of additional wage premium, increasing the level of inequalities; and, as in the Harris 
and Todaro (1970) model, the expected income of a potential immigrant depends on the 
probability of finding a job, which is more likely to happen in expanding cities. As the ‘Todaro 
Paradox’ explains, it can be the case that the inflow of workers to the urban sector exceeds 
urban labour demand, and it can result in increasing unemployment, which in turn increases 
inequality. This result can also arise in situations where international migrants are directed to 




                                                          
3 Figure A1.1. in Appendix 1 displays the relative distribution of urban population by country.  
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4. Empirical analysis 
Model specification 
The standard procedure for estimating the impact of inequality on growth is to assume a simple 
linear relationship where the growth rate of GDP per capita is regressed on a number of 
explanatory variables potentially explaining differences in growth rates, including a measure of 
income inequality. Specifically, 
ln 𝑦𝑖𝑡 − ln 𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝜏 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ln 𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝜏 + 𝛾𝑥𝑖𝑡−𝜏 + 𝜃𝑍𝑖𝑡−𝜏 + 𝑖𝑡   [1] 
where ln 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the logarithm of GDP per capita in region i at time t; 𝑥𝑖𝑡−𝜏 represents an income 
inequality measure (e.g., the Gini Index), Zit- is a set of control variables that account for factors 
underlying economic growth, and 𝑖𝑡 a random error term that varies across regions and periods. 
In particular, Zit- includes the degree and type of urban concentration, measured through the 
share of regional population living in cities, accounting for the size of the latter. More 
specifically, three classes of urban size were considered: less than 500,000 inhabitants, between 
0.5 and 1.5 million inhabitants, and beyond 1.5 million. Control variables also include 
demographics (e.g., age structure), the sectoral shares of the economy (agriculture, industry, 
and construction), education levels, the labour market participation rate, and one variable 
related to religion at the country level based on a Herfindahl Index of diversity in religion (as 
in Rodríguez-Pose and Tselios, 2010). Definitions and sources for all variables can be found in 
table A1.3 in Appendix 1. 
The estimation of the empirical model requires to tackle a list of econometric problems such as 
reverse causality and unobserved time-invariant region-specific characteristics and spatial 
dependence. As former aspects, factors such as technology, climate, institutions, and any other 
country-specific variable may be important determinants of growth rates and may be correlated 
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with the explanatory variables considered in the model. Many factors other than our controls 
are typically unobservable. By assuming those factors are constant over time and using 
longitudinal data, the suggested specification results in a modified panel data version of the 
previous equation, where one can control for unobservable factors. One of the possibilities is 
the use of regional fixed effects (FE). This procedure is supposed to account for most omitted 
variable bias. Nevertheless, it reduces the degrees of freedom and the measurement-error bias 
is aggravated, as the signal-to-noise ratio is further reduced by only using variation within 
regions (Neves et al., 2016). The estimated coefficients would then only reflect the effect of 
time variation within regions, and when the phenomenon under analysis mostly varies cross-
sectionally, the method may produce inaccurate results (Partridge, 2005). In our sample, the 
overall standard deviation of the Gini Index is 0.075, the between standard deviation being 
0.072 and the within standard deviation being 0.021. Consequently, the FE models would 
account for only a small fraction of the variation of inequality, and “the long-run cross-sectional 
effects would be subsumed into the fixed effects” (Fallah and Partridge, 2007: 381), in turn 
producing potentially misleading results (Barro, 2000). In addition, the short time intervals 
considered in this work and in other similar analyses (Rodríguez-Pose and Tselios, 2010) 
further question the use of FE to account for the omitted variable bias. Forbes (2000) also recalls 
that in panels with a limited time series length the estimation by fixed effects is not consistent, 
i.e., the size of the bias is much more important for the endogenous variable than for other right-
hand side. Finally, we also take into account the possibility of spatial dependence, as reported 
in Ezcurra (2007) and Perugini and Martino (2008). Ezcurra estimates a spatial error model 
considering inverse a spatial matrix based on the distance between the centroids, while Perugini 
and Martino (2008) apply both a spatial lag model and a spatial error model using a binary first-
order contiguity matrix.  
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Taking into account the previous exposition, our strategy to account for the omitted variable 
bias and for a large source of spatial heterogeneity is to include country dummies, and a set of 
controls. More specifically, the model in equation [1] is modified as follows: 
ln 𝑦𝑖𝑡 − ln 𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝜏 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ln 𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝜏 + 𝛾𝑥𝑖𝑡−𝜏 + 𝜃𝑍𝑖𝑡−𝜏 + Ξ𝑐 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡, [2] 
where Ξ𝑐 is a vector of country effects and 𝜂𝑡 represents a vector of time-specific effects.  
The option of estimating a dynamic panel model using the System GMM estimator was 
discarded for two reasons. First, the time dimension is too short for some countries, such as the 
United Kingdom. Second, System GMM is designed with the assumption that the only available 
instruments are ‘internal’ – based on lags of the instrumented variables (Roodman, 2009), and 
in our case these are correlated with the error term.4   
Reverse causality is treated by means of an instrumental variable approach, as it addresses the 
potential endogeneity of the lagged value of GDP per capita and inequality. One of the main 
strengths of our work is the amplitude of the regional coverage: more than 200 regions in 15 
different countries. Nevertheless, identifying valid instruments in such a sample is not 
straightforward. Taking this into account, we have followed a double strategy.   
In the first stage we have collected the following set of instruments: the murder rate, the elderly 
rate, and the share of registered voters who voted during general elections. These variables are 
used as instruments capable of capturing mainly the channels associated with political economy 
and political instability. 
Atems (2013) explores the way the political affiliation of US counties affects the inequality-
growth relationship and finds a strong heterogeneity. By considering the share of voters and the 
                                                          
4 The Hansen test with a reasonable number of instruments was robustly rejected for different geographical areas 
due to lags of the internal instruments, methods differences (between GMM and orthogonal System GMM), 
endogenous/predetermined consideration of the other control variables, and inclusion of external instruments. 
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elderly rate, one can capture part of the political economy channel and part of the demand 
dynamics. In the very short term the demographic structure of the regions is assumed as 
exogenous. Similarly, the functioning of democracies is a variable that, despite affecting the 
way inequality is associated with economic growth, has been found to have an ambiguous 
relationship with the latter (Doucouliagos and Ulubaşoğlu, 2008). The murder rate can be used 
as an indicator of political instability. As Powell et al. (2010, p. 349) conclude, there is ‘little 
evidence of the impact of crime on economic growth in cross-country Studies.’: while some 
studies report that crime has a significant negative influence on economic growth (Cárdenas, 
2007; Peri, 2004; Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2008), others infer that the impact is unclear (Goulas 
& Zervoyianni, 2012; Burnham et al., 2004) or even non-existing (Mauro & Carmeci, 2007; 
Chatterjee and Ray, 2014). We also considered the vegetation coverage of every region in order 
to consider permanent differences between regions (this is the only time-invariant instrument 
considered in our analysis). Instruments are considered both in levels and first differences. We 
admit that any reader can have serious concerns on this set of instruments by arguing that they 
hardly meet the exclusion restrictions, by having an effect on economic growth beyond the 
indirect effect via inequality. Consequently we are to be, first, particularly careful with the 
under and over identification tests, and second, with the interpretation of the results: any 
significant effect arising from the use of these instruments might be the result of a direct effect 
of these political economy related instruments.   
These caveats calls for a parallel strategy focused on exploiting an alternative channel through 
with inequality may affect economic growth. For that purpose we build a new instrument, using 
a two-step procedure following Brückner (2012, 2013) and Castells-Quintana (2016). We 
define an instrument based on Bartik’s (1991) industry mix for economic growth and we use it 
to build a valid instrument for inequality in the growth equation. We follow a new version of 
this instrument developed in Détang-Dessendre et al. (2016). First, we regress inequality as 
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dependent variable on economic growth using an IV approach. By construction, the residual of 
this equation captures any variation in the inequality measure that is not due to economic 
growth.  
As shown in more detail in Appendix 2, economic growth drives subsequent increases in overall 
and top income inequality and decreases in bottom income inequality. The derived instruments 
are free of these market-driven inequality changes. Despite our efforts to demonstrate that our 
generated instruments are valid, we again assume that they are based on the assumption that the 
sectoral share of every economy is not affecting subsequent inequality evolution. Again, we are 
particularly careful with the under and over identification tests and we assume that our approach 
may lower endogeneity concerns but is hardly likely to remove it completely.  
Econometric results  
Table 3 shows the estimates of the pooled OLS panel estimates with country fixed effects for 
different inequality measures. Our results report non-significant parameters for global measures 
of inequality (the Gini index and the 80-20 and 90-10 ratios). These measures hide a conflicting 
relationship with top-income inequality, which is marginally positive (10% of confidence), and 
bottom-income inequality and poverty indicators, which are significant and negative. Such 
results call for a specific focus on the different types of inequality and accommodate both to 
positive results (Perugini and Martino, 2008; Rodríguez-Pose and Tselios, 2010) and negative 
ones (Ezcurra, 2007). Regarding the coefficients of the other control variables, displayed in 
table A1.5 in Appendix 1, those related to GDP per capita and urban concentration are never 
significantly different from zero. On the other hand, the coefficients related to educational 
attainment and labour participation are positive and negative in sign, respectively, and 
statistically significant. The sectoral composition shows significant parameters, which are 
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significantly positive for regions with high shares in Agriculture and Industry. Finally, the 
coefficient related to religious diversity was always positive and significant. 
Table 4 shows results obtained with the random effects specification, including those with 
instrumental variable regressions considering standard instruments (IV1) and regressions 
considering industry mix derived instruments (IV2). As reported above, there may be some 
concerns on the suitability of our procedures for treating endogeneity. Consequently, from now 
on, we will interpret our results in terms of association rather than being strict in terms of 
causality interpretation. The estimates are performed for a global inequality statistic (the Gini 
index) and for the 90-50 and 50-10 ratios in order to capture any complex relationship between 
inequality resulting from different parts of the income distribution.5  
The random effects estimates of the Gini index replicate the results obtained in Table 3 for the 
pooled OLS regressions. Our heterogeneous results are in line with the meta-analysis of Neves 
et al. (2016) at the country level, who highlight that “although the average impact of inequality 
is not significant, there is a high degree of heterogeneity in the reported effect sizes” (Neves et 
al., 2016, p 397). In the previous section we find a heterogeneous association between economic 
growth and inequality by city size. Columns 2, 4 and 6 of table 4 show incremental parameters 
of income inequality as the shares of population in medium and large cities increase. Column 2 
shows the random effects results and displays significant and negative parameters for inequality 
measures in larger cities. This result is also obtained for top and bottom income inequality, 
although again a positive and significant parameter is found for top income inequality. At this 
stage we take into account the possibility of spatial effects, which are well documented in 
regional growth regressions in EU regions (Ezcurra, 2007; and Perugini and Martino, 2008). 
We have performed a list of panel regressions considering spatial error models, assuming both 
                                                          




contiguity and inverse distance matrices. We have performed these regressions considering a 
balanced panel of regions, as required by these procedures. Table A1.6 in the Appendix 1 
displays the main results, including the Pesaran (2004) cross-sectional dependence test for 
spatial models. The results show that in fact there is spatial dependence in the residuals. 
Nevertheless, and consistently with what found by Ezcurra, (2007) and Perugini and Martino 
(2008), the main results hold after addressing residual’s spatial dependence: a positive impact 
of top income inequality on economic growth, plus significant and negative parameters for 
inequality larger cities. Even though we assume the potential consequences of not considering 
spatial dependence and as far as the main results of our analysis are robust to its consideration, 
as in Perugini and Martino (2008) next we provide separate regressions for accounting for 
endogeneity. 
Thus, when we instrument inequality with so-called political instability channels (IV1), 
inequality turns statistically significant, though this does not occur for the market-free 
instruments (IV2).6 The coefficient related to top income inequality is negative and statistically 
significant under IV1 and but not significant under IV2, while the coefficient related to bottom 
income inequality is always negative and statistically significant.  
IV regressions display significant and negative parameters for the Gini index in larger cities. 
This result is also obtained for top and bottom income inequality, although it is not robust for 
IV2 sets of instruments. 
As a robustness, separate regressions for groups of regions according to their city size were 
performed (Table A1.7 in Appendix 1).7 We find again the significant and negative association 
                                                          
6 As the instruments used in the growth equation are generated regressors, standard errors on the slope coefficients 
are usually incorrect for hypothesis testing. However, as noted by Brückner (2013), in the special case of testing 
that slope coefficients are equal to zero these standard errors are correct.  
7 We also considered additional regressions by splitting the subsample of regions with smaller cities below and 
above 200,000 inhabitants. The obtained results remained unchanged, but we agree with one of the referees, that 
it is an interesting aspect to be considered as further research. 
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between inequality on economic growth in regions with medium and large cities, particularly 
when using the bottom income ratio. Overall, inequality is higher in regions with larger cities, 




Credit market imperfections and market size effects are potential mechanisms underlying the 
negative effects of inequality on economic growth. Possible explanations include stronger 
social ties in small cities and rural areas, which could limit the consequences of the 
imperfections in the credit markets. As for the market size effect, this might be linked to the 
high costs of living in cities (Combes et al., 2012), which are likely to depress particularly fixed 
salaries as well as government transfers and social benefits, usually established nationally rather 
than adjusted to local prices.  
The impact of the business cycle: Inequality and growth before and after the Great Recession  
Empirical findings on the inequality-growth relationship can be importantly affected by the 
time span considered.8 Results obtained in the short time-horizon considered here are hardly 
comparable with works such as Partridge (2005), which covers a period of 40 years for US 
states and finds a positive link between inequality and long-run economic growth, while FE 
results were much more ambiguous. Rodríguez-Pose and Tselios (2010) over the 1994-2001 
period and Perugini and Martino (2008) over two samples (1995-2004 and 2000-2004) also 
find a positive link in OLS estimates and non-significant results for the FE results, in line with 
our results, while Ezcurra (2007) over the 1993-2002 period reports a negative estimate. Our 
                                                          
8 In fact, it is also reasonable to argue that the results might be affected by alternative definitions of the dependent 
variable. We also developed our estimates considering two-year growth rates and exponentially smoothed data for 
both one year and two years growth rates. The main conclusions of our work hold. The results can be obtained 
from the authors upon request. 
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analysis includes the years before and after the economic crisis began in 2008. This makes it 
possible to verify whether the role of inequality on economic growth changed in a period of 
economic shocks. The hypothesis is that less unequal regions might show higher resilience to 
economic shocks, especially among regions in which inequality is relatively high, such as those 
with large metropolitan areas.   
Table 5 presents the results of a model that considers separate estimates for two sub-periods. 
The first model reports estimates of inequality on economic growth until 2006 (including the 
growth rate for 2006-07). The next sub-period already takes into account the downturn, as it 
considers inequality in 2007 and economic growth from 2007-08 onwards.9 Our results, which 
are robust to the type of inequality indicator, point to a clear effect of the Great Recession in 
turning the parameter negative and significant.  
[TABLE 5] 
These results confirm the idea that lower levels of inequality might have been relevant as an 
element of regional resilience against the shock of the crisis. Regions with smaller cities were 
less harmed by inequality during the Great Recession than regions with large cities. Even 
though the difficulty in reporting causality in this relationship, we believe that there is a 
significant association even after several aspects are considered. A possible interpretation is 
that places with lower levels of inequality – such as regions with relatively small cities – might 
have more room for increasing inequality by increasing the spatial concentration of economic 
activity. The benefits of agglomeration might, in fact, overcome the costs of higher levels of 
inequality.  
 
                                                          
9 We also tried with subsamples to divide the period with observations until 2007 and 2008. The results are robust 
for such alternative specifications. 
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5. Concluding remarks 
This paper analyses the association between income inequality and economic growth. The 
patterns of association between income inequality, urban size, and economic growth were 
investigated using a panel of regions from 15 OECD countries covering three continents over 
the period between 2003 and 2013. The obtained results provide support for a negative 
association between inequality and economic growth, especially when the former is measured 
focusing on the lower part of the income distribution. Such relationships are stronger in large 
cities, while in regions characterised by rural areas and small cities the relationship is non-
significant. These findings are stronger from the start of the economic crisis.  
Credit market imperfections and market size effects are potential mechanisms underlying the 
obtained results. If imperfections in the credit market are lower in less populated areas due to 
less asymmetric information flows, and closer contacts, this could lead to lower levels of 
inequality and to better incentives for wealth accumulation and higher economic growth. The 
market size channel could operate in the opposite direction: the higher costs of living in an 
urban area are not equally shared by its inhabitants, thus increasing within-region inequalities 
and depressing economic growth as fewer consumers can afford to buy goods.  
Future research could advance in three different, although related, directions: first, exploring 
the reasons for the increasing importance of inequality within cities and metropolitan areas and 
between regions is a relevant and scarcely analysed topic, second, testing alternative theories 
on the mechanisms through which urban size can alter the relationship between inequality and 
economic growth, especially in the short-run, and third working with city observations, what 
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Figure 1. Inequality (Gini Index) and GDP per capita growth: Cross-sectional and time 
components, OECD regions  
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on national household income surveys, various years. 
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Table 1. Correlation coefficients between GDP per capita growth and inequality  
  Gini Index p80-20 p90-50 p50-10 pov60 pov40 
 Raw data 
GDP per capita growth rate 0.148 0.089 0.163 0.028 0.044 0.055 
 Adjusted data (region and time dummies)  
GDP per capita growth rate -0.015 -0.019 0.033 -0.045 -0.053 -0.054 
Note: Bolded correlations are significant at 5% and italics correlations are significant at 10%. Adjusted data 
controls for region and time-fixed effects. Computations based on 1,983 observations. 
 
 
Table 2. Correlation between inequality and urbanisation rates 
  Gini Index p80-20 p90-50 p50-10 pov60 pov40 
Share of people living in FUAs 
of small size (<500,000) 
-0.154 -0.140 -0.100 -0.118 -0.144 -0.144 
Share of people living in FUAs 
of medium size (500,000-
1.5 million 
0.086 0.038 0.090 0.006 0.026 0.016 
Share of people living in FUAs 
of large size (>1.5 million) 
0.191 0.223 0.146 0.222 0.206 0.204 
Share of people living in FUAs 
(regardless of size) 
0.149 0.160 0.155 0.146 0.115 0.105 














Table 3. Pooled OLS estimates 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Gini p80-20 p90-10 p90-50 p50-10 pov40 pov60 
ln GDP per capita -0.0032 -0.0030 -0.0027 -0.0045 -0.0023 -0.0026 -0.0025 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Inequality 0.0014 -0.0004 -0.0003 0.0070* -0.0035** -0.0774* -0.0445 
 (0.024) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.040) (0.031) 
Urbanisation < 500,000 -0.0072 -0.0069 -0.0066 -0.0080 -0.0053 -0.0055 -0.0064 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Urbanisation  500,000-1.5 million -0.0024 -0.0022 -0.0020 -0.0035 -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0018 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Urbanisation  > 1.5 million -0.0009 -0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0023 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,793 1,793 1,793 1,793 1,793 1,793 1,793 
R2 0.401 0.401 0.401 0.402 0.402 0.403 0.402 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 4. RE and IV estimations of models for the Gini Index and the 9050 and 5010 ratios. 
  RE Pool-IV1 Pool-IV2 
 Gini Index 
Inequality -0.0011 0.0020 -1.0612** -0.2617 0.0083 0.0615 
 (0.025) (0.026) (0.453) (0.176) (0.036) (0.052) 
Inequality * Urb 0.5-1.5 million 
 -0.0107  -0.2067**  -0.0800 
 (0.009)  (0.088)  (0.069) 
Inequality * Urb > 1.5 million 
 -0.0339***  -0.2398***  -0.1760** 
 (0.011)  (0.080)  (0.087) 
Observations 1,793 1,793 1,688 1,688 1,58 1,58 
R2 0.401 0.403         
SW test -Ineqt-1  pval   0.074 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SW test -Ineqt-1*Urb 0,5-1,5M 
pval   
 0.000  0.000 
SW test -Ineqt-1*Urb>1,5 M pval   
 0.000  0.000 
Hansen p-value     0.752 0.230 0.139 0.566        
 p90-50 ratio 
Inequality 0.0070* 0.0080** -0.0762** 0.0160 0.0078 0.0052 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.030) (0.055) (0.006) (0.008) 
Inequality * Urb 0.5-1.5 million 
 -0.0013  -0.0409*  0.0104 
 (0.001)  (0.024)  (0.009) 
Inequality * Urb > 1.5 million 
 -0.0045***  -0.0517*  -0.0040 
 (0.002)  (0.028)  (0.011) 
Observations 1,793 1,793 1,688 1,725 1,58 1,58 
R2 0.402 0.404         
SW test -Ineqt-1  pval   0.001 0.053 0.000 0.000 




 0.057  0.000 
SW test -Ineqt-1*Urb>1,5 M pval   
 0.059  0.000 
Hansen p-value     0.342 0.141 0.398 0.546        
 p50-10 ratio 
Inequality -0.0037** -0.0023 -0.0308** -0.0066 -0.0051** -0.0037 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.014) (0.011) (0.003) (0.003) 
























Observations 1,793 1,793 1,688 1,688 1,58 1,58 
R2 0.402 0.405         
SW test -Ineqt-1  pval 
   
0.002 0.000 0.000 
SW test -Ineqt-1*Urb 0,5-1,5M 
pval 




SW test -Ineqt-1*Urb>1,5 M pval 




Hansen p-value     0.153 0.121 0.409 0.290 
Notes: Estimations using robust standard errors. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. SW reports the Sanderson-
Windmeijer (2016) underidentifaction test (SW) of individual endogenous regressors. Hansen J statistic tests the 
null hypothesis of instrument validity under the assumption of heteroskedasticity. All estimates include country 
and time fixed effects. All pool IV regressions include time and country fixed effects and all controls listed in table 








Table 5. Estimation of models by sub-periods  
   Gini  p90-50 ratio  p50-10 ratio 
    2003-07 2007-13  2003-07 2007-13  2003-07 2007-13 
   
  IV1 – Political economy channels set of instruments 
Inequality  -0.2707 -0.4511  -0.0064 -0.1325**  -0.0061 -0.0385* 
   (0.203) (0.279)  (0.019) (0.055)  (0.008) (0.022) 
           
Observations  603 1,085  603 1,085  603 1,085 
SW p-value   0.000 0.001  0.000 0.029  0.000 0.086 
Hansen p-value   0.433 0.107  0.262 0.538  0.298 0.161 
           
   IV2 – Market-free set of instruments 
Inequality  -0.0359 0.0255  0.0011 0.0066  -0.0026 -0.0048* 
   (0.038) (0.056)  (0.007) (0.008)  (0.004) (0.003) 
           
Observations  681 1,056  681 1,056  681 1,056 
SW p-value   0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
Hansen p-value   0.552 0.126  0.440 0.140  0.580 0.360 
Notes: Estimations using robust standard errors. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. SW reports the Sanderson-
Windmeijer (2016) underidentifaction test (SW) of individual endogenous regressors. Hansen J statistic tests the 
null hypothesis of instrument validity under the assumption of heteroskedasticity. All estimates include country 
and time fixed effects. All regressions are pool IV and include time and country fixed effects and all controls listed 








Table A1.1. Mechanisms underlying the relationship between income inequality and 
economic growth 
Inequality as a growth-enhancing factor Inequality as a growth-hindering factor 
LONG-TERM 
Accumulation of physical and human capital 
Higher levels of physical capital investment (rich 
people have higher savings rates) (Barro, 2000; 
Dynan et al., 2004; Kaldor, 1957) 
Lower levels of human capital accumulation under 
credit market imperfections (Bénabou, 2002; Galor 
and Zeira, 1993; Easterly, 2001) 
Economic incentives 
More incentives for competition and risk taking 
(Rebelo, 1991; Voitchovsky, 2005) 
Fewer incentives to borrow (Aghion et al., 1999a) 
Political economy arguments 
Higher levels of wealth can induce less effort in the 
presence of market imperfections due to moral 
hazard (Aghion et al., 1999a) 
Higher taxes allow investment in public education 
and health (Saint-Paul and Verdier, 1993) 
Voters opt for higher taxation and redistribution, 
decreasing incentives to invest and reducing 
growth (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Persson and 
Tabellini, 1994) 
SHORT-TERM 
Credit market  
Rising inequality can increase credit demand to 
maintain constant consumption levels (Rajan, 
2010).  
On the supply side, more loans to more risky 
individuals can generate financial instability 
(Perugini et al., 2016) 
Demand-side dynamics 
Dynamic price effect (those with higher incomes 
may be more willing to pay for new goods, 
stimulating investment and innovation) (Bertola et 
al., 2006; Foellmi and Zwerimuller, 2006) 
Market size effect (fewer consumers can afford to buy  
new goods) (Bertola et al., 2006; Foellmi and 
Zwerimuller, 2006) 
Political and macroeconomic instability 
 Greater political instability – exacerbated at local 
level by residential segregation – creates 
uncertainty and reduces investment, hindering 
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Table A1.2. Data sources for income inequality measures 





European Union Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions (EU-SILC) 
2003-2010 3 regions 
Canada Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID) 2004-2011 10 regions 
Chile 
Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica 
Nacional (CASEN) 




European Union Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions (EU-SILC) 
2004-2010, 2012 8 regions 
Estonia 
European Union Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions (EU-SILC) 
2003-2010, 2012 1 region 
Finland  
European Union Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions (EU-SILC) 
2003-2010, 2012 4 regions 
France 
European Union Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions (EU-SILC) 
2003-2010, 2012 22 regions 
Greece 
European Union Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions (EU-SILC) 
2003-2010, 2012 4 regions 
Italy Indagine sulle condizioni di vita (UDB IT SILC) 2003-2012 21 regions 
Korea Korean Labour & Income Panel Study (KLIPS) 




European Union Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions (EU-SILC) 
2003-2010, 2012 1 region 
Mexico 
Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso y Gastos de los 
Hogares (ENIGH) 




European Union Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions (EU-SILC) 
2003- 2010, 2012 19 regions 
United 
Kingdom 
European Union Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions (EU-SILC) 
2010, 2011, 2013 12 regions 






Table A1.3. Data description 
Variable Definition Source 
ln GDP per capita 
Log of per capita GDP in constant millions of USD PPP 
(reference year 2005) 
OECD Regional Statistics 
Gini  Gini Index of household income  
Authors’ calculations based on 
national income household 
surveys 
p80-20 Quintile ratio  
Authors’ calculations based on 
national income household 
surveys 
p90-10 Decile ratio 
Authors’ calculations based on 
national income household 
surveys 
p90-50 Top decile ratio 
Authors’ calculations based on 
national income household 
surveys 
p50-10 Bottom decile ratio 
Authors’ calculations based on 
national income household 
surveys 
pov40 Poverty: poverty line at 40% of national median income 
Authors’ calculations based on 
national income household 
surveys 
pov60 Poverty: poverty line at 60% of national median income OECD Regional Statistics   
Urbanisation 
Share of regional population living in OECD functional 
urban areas (FUA) 
OECD Regional and 
Metropolitan Statistics (OECD, 
2012) 
Total population Total regional population (log)  OECD Regional Statistics   
Religion diversity 
Inverse of Herfindahl Index on the shares of different 
religions (no sub-aggregates) 
World Religion Dataset, ATLA 
Share of the most popular 
religion 
Share of the most popular religion (no sub-aggregates 
considered) 
World Religion Dataset, ATLA 
Agriculture share 
Share of gross value added (GVA) in agriculture, forestry 
and fishing over total GVA 
OECD Regional Statistics   
Industry share 
Share of GVA in industry, including energy, over total 
GVA 
OECD Regional Statistics   
Construction share Share of GVA in construction over total GVA OECD Regional Statistics  
Education share in low 
levels  
Share of the labour force in lower education levels (0-2 
ISCED groups) 
OECD Regional Statistics 
Education share in average 
levels 
Share of the labour force in middle education levels (3-4 
ISCED groups) 
OECD Regional Statistics 
Education share in high 
levels 
Share of the labour force in higher education levels (5-6 
ISCED groups) 
OECD Regional Statistics 
Elderly rate 
Elderly rate (ratio between people aged 65 years or more 
and people aged 15-64 years), expressed in percentage 
OECD Regional Statistics 
Unemployment rate Proportion of unemployed people over total labour force OECD Regional Statistics 
Labour force participation 
rate 
Participation rate (labour force divided by the working-age 
population 15-64 years old), expressed in percentage 
OECD Regional Statistics 
Voters 
Percentage of registered voters who voted during general 
elections 
OECD Regional Statistics 





Table A1.4. Data descriptive statistics 
  Mean 
Standard deviation 
Minimum Maximum Regions 
Overall Between Within 
Total population 3622937 4295609 4295707 285634.1 63303 38,000,000 209 
GDP per capita 33951.6 17544.18 17577.29 2900.251 5159 173750 209 
GDP per capita 
growth rate 
0.0108 0.0361 0.0142 0.0333 -0.3138 0.3340 209 
Gini Index 0.3611 0.0749 0.0717 0.0208 0.1993 0.5572 209 
p80-20 3.0420 0.8195 0.7640 0.2618 1.6685 8.0888 209 
p90-10 5.8903 2.4429 2.2785 0.7637 2.3295 23.6075 209 
p90-50 2.2490 0.4499 0.4216 0.1531 1.3043 4.1827 209 
p50-10 2.5527 0.7309 0.6628 0.2816 1.5129 8.3092 209 
pov40 0.0940 0.0516 0.0484 0.0165 0.0000 0.2859 209 
pov60 0.2099 0.0605 0.0563 0.0210 0.0538 0.4672 209 
Urbanisation 0.5561 0.2360 0.2337 0.0134 0.0000 1.1628 209 
Religion diversity 1.5267 0.3669 0.3597 0.0762 1.0622 2.9479 209 
Agriculture share 3.4491 3.6123 3.4206 1.1595 0.0000 31.7369 209 
Industry share 21.1816 11.2430 11.1343 2.6013 0.8607 87.9038 209 
Construction share 7.1083 2.8786 2.3956 1.5674 0.9815 30.3747 209 
Education share in 
lower levels  
30.0951 18.6921 19.0714 3.9750 2.5955 100.0000 209 
Education share in 
average levels  
43.7125 15.8637 16.0787 2.1304 0.0000 85.3288 209 
Education share in 
high levels 
26.1924 10.1120 9.5698 3.1349 0.0000 63.9213 209 
Elderly rate 20.6112 7.7873 7.6684 1.4500 3.6000 45.6500 209 
Unemployment rate 7.5502 4.8759 4.0600 2.7150 0.2000 37.0000 209 




4.7239 8.5108 6.4271 5.2590 0.0000 188.5000 209 

























LU CL FI ES IT FR GR CZ CA GB US KR MX EE BE
Share pop FUA < 200k Share pop FUA 200k-500k




Table A1.5. Pooled OLS estimates 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Gini p80-20 p90-10 p90-50 p50-10 pov40 pov60 
ln GDP per capita -0.0032 -0.0030 -0.0027 -0.0045 -0.0023 -0.0026 -0.0025 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Inequality 0.0014 -0.0004 -0.0003 0.0070* -0.0035** -0.0774* -0.0445 
 (0.024) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.040) (0.031) 
Urbanisation < 500,000 -0.0072 -0.0069 -0.0066 -0.0080 -0.0053 -0.0055 -0.0064 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Urbanisation  500,000-1.5 million -0.0024 -0.0022 -0.0020 -0.0035 -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0018 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Urbanisation  > 1.5 million -0.0009 -0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0023 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Labour force participation rate -0.0004* -0.0004* -0.0004* -0.0003 -0.0005** -0.0005** -0.0005* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Education share in low levels (0-2 
ISCED) 
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Education share in high levels (5-6 
ISCED) 
0.0006** 0.0006** 0.0006** 0.0006** 0.0006** 0.0006** 0.0006** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Industry share 0.0003* 0.0003* 0.0003* 0.0003** 0.0003* 0.0003* 0.0003* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Agriculture share 0.0010* 0.0010* 0.0010* 0.0010* 0.0009* 0.0009* 0.0009* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Construction share 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 0.0004 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Religion diversity 0.0387** 0.0390** 0.0394** 0.0376** 0.0412** 0.0409*** 0.0410** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Constant -0.0087 -0.0092 -0.0121 -0.0106 -0.0131 -0.0119 -0.0104 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.046) (0.044) (0.043) (0.044) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,793 1,793 1,793 1,793 1,793 1,793 1,793 
R2 0.401 0.401 0.401 0.402 0.402 0.403 0.402 





Table A1.6. Estimations of spatial error models for the Gini Index and the 9050 and 5010 
ratios (balanced sample – 1,295 observations = 185 regions x 7 time periods 2004-2010) 
  RE Contiguity Inv. distance RE Contiguity Inv. distance 
 Gini Index 
Inequality 0.0078 0.0123 0.0158 0.0108 0.0158 0.0187 
 (0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.033) (0.032) (0.033) 
Inequality * Urb 0.5-1.5 million 
   -0.0130 -0.0139 -0.0127 
   (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Inequality * Urb > 1.5 million 
   -0.0462*** -0.0453*** -0.0435*** 
   (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) 
Lambda  0.1336*** 0.4207***  0.1332*** 0.4149*** 
  (0.047) (0.081)  (0.047) (0.081) 
       
Observations 1,295 1,295 1,295 1,295 1,295 1,295 
R2 0.409 0.409 0.409 0.413  0.413 0.412 
Pesaran (2004) CD test 7.653***   7.664***          
 p90-50 ratio 
Inequality 0.0075* 0.0068* 0.0073* 0.0088** 0.0082* 0.0086** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Inequality * Urb 0.5-1.5 million 
   -0.0017 -0.0019 -0.0018 
   (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Inequality * Urb > 1.5 million 
   -0.0067*** -0.0067*** -0.0065*** 
   (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Lambda  0.131*** 0.4170***  0.130*** 0.4133*** 
  (0.048) (0.083)  (0.048) (0.083) 
       
Observations 1,295 1,295 1,295 1,295 1,295 1,295 
R2 0.410 0.410 0.410 0.413 0.413 0.413 
Pesaran (2004) CD test 7.527***   7.516***          
 p50-10 ratio 
Inequality -0.0015 -0.0009 -0.0004 0.0009 0.0017 0.0022 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Inequality * Urb 0.5-1.5 million 
 
  -0.0017 -0.0018 -0.0018  
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Inequality * Urb > 1.5 million 
 
  -0.0054*** -0.0053*** -0.0053***  
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Lambda  0.133*** 0.4189***  0.131*** 0.4144*** 






Observations 1,295 1,295 1,295 1,295 1,295 1,295 
R2 0.409 0.409 0.409 0.413 0.413 0.412 
Pesaran (2004) CD test 7.680***   7.654***   
Notes: Estimations using robust standard errors. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. All estimates include time and 







Table A1.7. City size differentials in the inequality and growth relationship 






































   
  IV1 – Political economy channels set of instruments 
Inequality  -0.2994 -0.1007 -0.5710***  -0.0490 0.0763 -0.0225 
 -0.0047 -0.0344* -0.0154** 
  (0.489) (0.250) (0.215)  (0.053) (0.057) (0.015) 
 (0.017) (0.019) (0.007)              
Observations  757 513 450  757 513 450  757 513 450 
SW p-value  0,021 0,031 0,000  0,000 0,025 0,000  0,003 0,011 0,000 
Hansen p-
value  
0.655 0.142 0.747 
 
0.810 0.331 0.336 
 
0.567 0.275 0.291 
   
  IV2 – Market-free set of instruments 
Inequality  0.0646 -0.0690 -0.0863 
 0.0020 0.0181 0.0118  -0.0031 -0.0113* -0.0065 
  (0.049) (0.080) (0.065) 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.009)  (0.003) (0.006) (0.004)              
Observations  730 444 406 
 730 444 406  730 444 406 
SW p-value  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hansen p-
value  
0.348 0.060 0.222 
 
0.185 0.127 0.280 
 
0.196 0.106 0.155 
Notes: Estimations using robust standard errors. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. SW reports the Sanderson-
Windmeijer (2016) underidentifaction test (SW) of individual endogenous regressors. Hansen J statistic tests the 
null hypothesis of instrument validity under the assumption of heteroskedasticity. All estimates include country 
and time fixed effects. All regressions are pool IV and include time and country fixed effects and all controls listed 






Appendix 2.  
Identification strategy for inequality based on industry-mix instruments for economic growth. 
 
We follow the empirical literature by building valid instruments for inequality by using valid 
instruments for economic growth. We use a two-step procedure following Brückner (2012, 2013) and 
Castells-Quintana (2016) to adjust simultaneity bias. The starting point is a simultaneous equation model 
where inequality (𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑡) and economic growth (∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+1) are mutually related: 
∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+1 = 𝛼(𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑡) + 𝑢𝑡     (A1) 
𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑡 = 𝜃(∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑡) + 𝑒𝑡     (A2) 
Our interest is parameter 𝛼, but if 𝜃 is not zero, OLS estimates in A1 will be biased and inconsistent. In 
order to overcome this problem we can use instrumental variables for inequality. If we can consistently 
estimate 𝜃 in A2, we can construct such instruments to be used in A1 by capturing the residual: ?̂?𝑡 =












Still, as far as 𝐶𝑂𝑉(𝑒, 𝑢) ≠ 0 the omitted variable bias will exist. In order to avoid that bias, we include 
a large structure of country-period fixed effects in A2 together with additional controls when needed. 
Castells-Quintana (2016) displays the identification of the adjustment in 𝛼. In the IV estimation of A1, 
the first step will be: 
𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑡 = 𝛿 𝑟𝑒𝑠(𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑡) + 𝑣𝑡 = 𝛿 ( 𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑡 − 𝜃∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑡) + 𝑣𝑡 
The residuals of this equation are: 
𝑣𝑡 = 𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑡 − 𝛿 ( 𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑡 − 𝜃∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑡) 
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The Control Function Approach (see Woolridge, 2010) allows us to capture the size of the bias by 
including 𝑣𝑡 in A1: 
∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+1 = 𝛽0∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼 𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑣 + 𝜋𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡 
Which finally turns out to be: 
∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+1 = 𝛽0∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + (𝛼 + 𝜑(1 − 𝛿)) 𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜑𝜃?̂?∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑡 + 𝜋𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡 
As 𝜑(1 − 𝛿) is the size of the adjustment of the simultaneity bias, which depends on 𝜑, the role of past 
growth, ∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑡, in explaining current growth, ∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+1, and (1 − 𝛿), the share of the variation in 
Inequality due to economic growth. Given the short-run nature of our data, we expect 𝜑 to be large, 
which is an augmenting factor of the bias in non-instrumented estimates.  
The instrument proposed for estimating A2 consistently is based on the Industry Mix strategy. The 
classical industry mix (Bartik, 1991) has been used as an exogenous instrument in local labour market 
analysis. In our case, we consider the sectoral combination of every region and apply to it the aggregate 
growth rates for every sector. More recently, Détang-Dessendre et al. (2016) (DDPP onwards) have 
applied an alternative approach, where the economic growth of every region is regressed against the 
initial period’s sectoral distribution. While the Bartik’s industry-mix restricts each sector to the overall 
growth rate, the authors suggest that this alternative procedure takes into account the sectoral 
combination impact and allows for differing local multiplier effects when doing separate regressions for 
subsamples, in our case, different continents. In order to mitigate any endogeneity in industry structure, 
the sectoral shares are lagged for several years.  
We have built several potential instruments. First, we built the Bartik’s industry-mix, considering up to 
four lags of the sectoral structure (labelled as B1 to B4). We have also followed the DDPP regression 
approach, where regional economic growth is regressed against the sectoral distribution of gross value 
added, lagged up to four lags. According to these authors, an advantage of the regression approach is 
that it considers the differing multiplier effects across industries, while Bartik’s instrument restricts each 
sector to the national growth rate, independent of the spillover effects on each sector. We have 
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considered two alternatives. The first assumes different parameters in the regression for every country10 
(labelled as DDPP1 to DDPP4), while the second uses the same set of parameters for all regions in our 
sample (labelled as DDPP_all_1 to DDPP_all_4). Table A2.1 displays the relationship between 
economic growth and every alternative instrument, together with the correlation between them. Given 
the annual nature of our data set, we believe it is normal that these correlations are high compared to 
those found by DDPP.   
Once the instruments for economic growth are defined, we use them to build a valid instrument for 
inequality in the growth equation. First, we regress inequality on economic growth using an IV approach 
using the industry mix and the regression-based industry mix as instruments for growth: 
𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌1(∆𝑦𝑖𝑡−1,𝑡) +  𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏𝑡
𝑐 +  𝜈𝑖𝑡     (A3) 
where 𝑎𝑖 are region fixed effects, 𝑏𝑡
𝑐 are year fixed effects specific to every continent, which, in turn, 
allows us to control for a wide range of fixed and time varying omitted variables.  
By construction, the residual of such equation captures any variation in the inequality measure that is 
not due to economic growth. Of course, we have to check for the validity of such variables as instruments 
for economic growth. Such instruments have to be relevant and exogenous. In order to perform the over 
identification test, we have also included a second instrument—the vegetation coverage of every 
region—which can be linked to the weight of agriculture. In such estimations, we have substituted region 
fixed effects by country specific time dummies in order to avoid perfect identification, so that we are 
able to compute over identification tests in subsequent steps. Table A2.2 presents first-stage OLS 
estimations for growth on the sectoral shares instruments.  
The second step in building the instrument for inequality in the growth equation consists in regressing 
inequality on economic growth, which is instrumented by means of the battery of instruments, including 
Bartik’s and DDPP options. For the instruments to be valid, they should not only be relevant (explain 
economic growth), but should also be exogenous and affect inequality only through economic growth. 
                                                          
10 In order to avoid perfect identification of countries with a single TL2 region, we have merged Luxembourg with 
Belgium and Estonia with Finland.  
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In addition to the previous first stage regression, tables A2.3 and A2.4 report the Sanderson-Windmeijer 
Chi squared test. In most cases the Bartik’s based instruments reject at 5% the null hypothesis of 
underidentification.   
As for exogeneity, we first assume that the sectoral structure of the regional economies and national 
growth rates are hardly to be affected by local inequality indicators. In order to capture country-specific 
omitted variables bias, we control for a large set of fixed effects. Table A2.3 reports the estimates of 
equation A3 for Gini, p9050 and p5010 including regional fixed effects. Table A2.4 shows estimates of 
equation A3 adding vegetation coverage as a secondary instrument and country specific time dummies. 
This table displays relevance and exogeneity tests. As can be seen, DDPP4 instruments are robust to the 
inequality indicator and to the lag structure when building the instrument.  
As additional checks, we compute several measures of association between our generated instrument 
and the dependent variable (and residuals) of our main equation. Thus, as an additional check we have 
computed the correlation between the residuals of equations A1 and A2 for every indicator of inequality. 
As reported above, we consider the DDPP4 instrument. Next we display the scatterplots.  
Figure A2.1. Gini Index.  corr (û, ê ) = 0.004 
 





















Figure A2.3. P5010. corr (û, ê ) = -0.001 
 
 
Finally, we have also performed an additional check. We have considered the main regressions 
substituting the inequality indicator by our generated instrument. In some occasions they arise as 
significant (p5010). Subsequently we have considered together the inclusion of the inequality indicator 
and the generated instrument. In these new regressions the generated instrument stops being significant 
(see Table A2.5). We interpret that as a proof that the instrument is only affecting economic growth 
through the inequality indicator.  
It is important to understand that the sign of the parameters in these regressions is not our main concern. 
Our aim is to obtain consistent estimates and good instruments for our main regressions. Nevertheless, 
the analysis of tables A2.3 and A2.4 allows us to see that, economic growth, if any, is associated 
positively with top income inequality (the most significant parameters in p9050 regressions are positive) 
and negatively with bottom income inequality (the most significant parameters in p9050 regressions are 



































positive when significant. Consequently, the instruments derived here capture the part of inequality that 





Table A2.1. Pearson correlation coefficient between Economic growth, Bartik and 
Regression based instruments. 
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Table A2.2. First-stage OLS estimations for economic growth on the instruments based on 
sectoral shares 
  B1 B2 B3 B4 
 
DDPP1 DDPP2 DDPP3 DDPP4 
 




Industry Mix  0.8124*** 0.7941*** 0.8329*** 0.8284***  1.2360*** 1.4300*** 1.0851*** 0.9753***  0.9806** 1.4830*** 1.6196*** 1.2990*** 
  (0.042) (0.043) (0.047) (0.049)  (0.168) (0.150) (0.108) (0.128)  (0.395) (0.279) (0.282) (0.371) 
                
Observations  2,294 2,085 1,876 1,667  2,646 2,551 2,342 2,133  2,646 2,551 2,342 2,133 
R-squared 
 
0.452 0.469 0.476 0.474 
 
0.363 0.385 0.391 0.391 
 
0.318 0.340 0.345 0.347 
                
                
  B1 B2 B3 B4 
 
DDPP1 DDPP2 DDPP3 DDPP4 
 




Industry Mix  0.6489*** 0.5892*** 0.5592*** 0.5644***  0.8087*** 0.8933*** 0.8204*** 0.7982***  1.0155*** 0.9510*** 0.9097*** 0.7897*** 
  (0.087) (0.089) (0.106) (0.112)  (0.105) (0.088) (0.088) (0.099)  (0.232) (0.182) (0.173) (0.223) 
                
Vegetation 
Coverage 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000  -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
                
Observations  2,294 2,085 1,876 1,667  2,646 2,551 2,342 2,133  2,646 2,551 2,342 2,133 
R-squared 
 
0.492 0.504 0.500 0.497 
 
0.494 0.515 0.520 0.522 
 
0.485 0.499 0.506 0.510 
Note: the upper panel includes region fixed effects estimations with continent-specific time dummies. The lower 





Table A2.3.  First step estimation for generation Inequality instruments. Instrumental 
variables estimation. 














             
































0) (0.146) (0.096) 
(0.069
) (0.086) (3.606) (0.348) (0.172) (0.206) 







































1) (0.844) (0.608) 
(0.489
) (0.619) (22.562) (2.801) (1.361) (1.673) 







































8) (1.492) (1.140) 
(0.963
) (1.253) (32.537) (3.505) (2.145) (3.102) 







0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.464 0.004 0.000 0.001 
             
Region FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 













Table A2.4.  First step estimation for generation Inequality instruments. TSLS estimates 
including vegetation coverage as instrument 

























































(0.224) (0.220) (0.291) (0.419) 










0.0357 0.0571 0.0499 
0.03
98 
0.0130 0.0154 0.0141 0.0086 
Hansen J 









0.140 0.150 0.245 
0.51
9 






































3) (1.838) (1.520) (1.841) (2.543) 









58 0.0357 0.0571 0.0499 
0.03
98 0.0130 0.0154 0.0141 0.0086 
Hansen J 








27 0.0423 0.0429 0.0633 
0.16










































6) (3.507) (2.699) (3.072) (4.041) 









58 0.0357 0.0571 0.0499 
0.03
98 0.0130 0.0154 0.0141 0.0086 
Hansen J 








1 0.355 0.300 0.266 
0.11
7 0.290 0.373 0.464 0.201 



















6 1,970 1,926 1,882 
1,78
7 1,970 1,926 1,882 1,787 
Note: Sanderson-Windmiejer (SW) Chi sq tests the significance of excluded instruments, being the null that the 
endogenous regressor is unidentified. Hansen J test that the excluded instruments are uncorrelated with the error 
term. All estimates include the Bartik or the DDPP instruments plus the variable Vegetation Coverage, which 




Table A2.5. Exogeneity check. Pool OLS estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Dep. Var: 
Economic growth Gini P9050 P5010 
Generated 
Instrument 0.0142 0.0259 0.0077 0.0062 -0.0048** -0.0041 
 (0.036) (0.070) (0.006) (0.010) (0.002) (0.004) 
Inequality  -0.0119  0.0015  -0.0008 
  (0.053)  (0.007)  (0.003) 
       
Controls  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       
Observations 1,580 1,580 1,580 1,580 1,580 1,580 
R2 0.420 0.420 0.421 0.421 0.421 0.421 
 
 
 
 
 
